Linkedin Leaked Passwords List Download

If you’re not sure how strong your password is, test sample passwords with our password checker here.That is irrelevant in the face of leaked passwords; what matters most in that situation is that your password is something other than your leaked one.If the passwords were leaked due to being stored in plain-text, no amount of complexity would protect them, obviously.Don't use the same password on multiple sites. If your LinkedIn password is leaked, you don't want that same password to grant access to your bank account. That just as important than how strong the password is, if not more.If some site has suffered a password leak, and you're a user of that site, you must change the password on that site, and also on all other sites where you happened to use the same password. Do it as quickly as possible without worrying how strong the new passwords are. Then change later to stronger ones.A password's strength is inversely proportional to how often you change it. For instance, if you happen to change a password every week (for the sake of argument-few people likely do), and it takes a month to crack on the best available hardware cluster, then you're probably okay.

If you change only once a year, you're much less okay; a surreptitious password breach could happen, and two months of cracking later, the attackers have your password. Meanwhile, you're still months away from changing it, not knowing there had been a breach.By the time users learn about a breach-if ever-they should assume that their passwords have been cracked, because some unknown amount of time has passed between the actual break and the discovery. The discovery will likely stem from the fact that some of the 'lower hanging' passwords have been cracked and accounts start being misused.

The site admins can then only guess from various circumstantial information (logs or whatever other breadcrumbs left bind) about when the leak might have occurred. If the passwords were leaked due to being stored in plain-text, no amount of complexity would protect them, obviously.One assumes LinkedIn does not store plain text passwords anywhere. That would be against best practice for the average PhpBB online forum from the late 90s. It would be criminal negligence from a company like LinkedIn. How strong your password is (and which kind of hashing function the site uses) does influence how long it takes to obtain a plausible plain text password assuming that the exfiltrated data is in the form of a list of salted hashes, which is the most reasonable assumption.That said, changing passwords everywhere remains the safest course. Since: a) 4 years is a long time to run a password cracker + dictionary, b) there is always the possibility that the passwords were intercepted on server memory before hashing. Accounts aren't all created equal.

Some of my accounts, such as my domain account at work and my online banking account have real power to screw me over. Some are in the middle, like my LinkedIn account, or my gmail account, since they could be used for social engineering. Some are trivial like my Fark account or my Hacker News account. In that last tier, there's no way it's worth my time to keep rotating those on a regular basis. It wouldn't be even that much of a crime to use the same password on them, since there's virtually no way someone's going to pivot from a Fark account into my bank account. So quit being so dogmatic is what I'm saying.

I would recommend lofting your email authentication into the same protection category as your bank account:a) There is a nonzero probability that your bank can be socially engineered using information obtained from compromising your email account and anything that trusts it.b) An email account compromise implicitly means every service that resets/recovers through it has to be rekeyed. The subsequent cleaning of the stables can be messy, lengthy, and itself somewhat risky.In particular, if you haven't already, enable MFA. If your email provider does not support MFA, change your provider. It wouldn't be even that much of a crime to use the same password on them, since there's virtually no way someone's going to pivot from a Fark account into my bank account.

So quit being so dogmatic is what I'm saying.This is 2016, we have password managers. Using different passwords for each site shouldn't be any more difficult than if you had not. Even using the built in ones in your browser of choice is better than not using one at all and makes using site specific passwords easy. Chrome even has a built in password generator for you, I assume this is using your operating systems CSPRNG (or BoringSSL's?) although I'm not 100% sure about that. 1: Change your password.

Password dictionaries. These are dictionaries that come with tools/worms/etc, designed for cracking passwords. As far as I know, I'm not breaking any licensing agreements by mirroring them with credit; if you don't want me to host one of these files, let me know and I'll remove it. A LinkedIn hack from back in 2012 is still causing problems for its users. The company announced this morning that another data set from the hack, which contains over 100 million LinkedIn members.

If you’re not sure how strong your password is, test sample passwords with our password checker here. Seriously?Keep in mind that these estimates are based on some bogus entropy estimation. If a password hacking guy runs the correct dictionary past the hashes you password generates, it might be as small, well, as the first one tried. For example, run the passphrase Ph'nglui mglw'nafh Cthulhu R'lyeh wgah'nagl fhtagn1 past the kaspersky bruteforce estimator, you get 10,000 centuries. But this is clearly false, as inicated in. They clearly 'cracked' this in far less time: 'in a matter of minutes'. Work sent around a stupid cardboard stand which was supposed to tell us all about being excellent at our work, and the checking processes required before sending anything to clients etc etc.We were changing domains at the same time, so my new password root is now based on the first three characters of the first 3 lines of the thing, which included some punctuation, then the standard numeral to increment every 90 days.My password was in plain sight for a couple months before I got around to binning it, which actually makes life a lot easier.

Especially when you're not using it often enough for it to be muscle memory - which is the problem my parents face. Yes, that is the actual instructions that they give.Imagine a relative of yours who is much less computer savvy than you are. What are the chances that the actually enter their real password?And what value is this check, actually, on a fake password. 'Your fake password will take xxx centuries to crack'.

So how does the non-tech savvy person, who might have a struggle coming up with a real, useful password, then enter one that is similar but not exact and expect a measured response?So even if they collect 'simulated' passwords, password cracking is less about entropy and more about generating dictionaries based on patterns that users are likely to use.There isn't any value in such a site, and I claim it is less than useful. That's an old and outdated page. Pokemon mystery dungeon explorers of darkness rom system. 1Password has moved to a subscription model, thus storing the encrypted database themselves. The old 'offline' option is still around, but it has been deemphasized, for one because they stopped implementing features supporting it (like an offline HTML interface for opvault, or sync with other clouds besides Dropbox).

Even more upsetting is that the standalone version is now much more expensive than it was. They did that to increase the attractiveness of their subscriptions of course. And the writing is on the wall really. Depends on how that password is stored. Mostly.Your alphabet, lowercase + uppercase + digits + symbols, has 72 characters. There are 72 ways to pick the first character of your password, 72 ways to pick the second, etc. So there are 72 to the 25th power possible passwords, about 7.5 times 10 to the 46th (about 7 followed by 46 zeroes).That's fewer possibilities than the number of atoms in the universe and fewer possibilities than the ways you can order a deck of cards, but if a computer can calculate one hash per nanosecond, it'd take about.

Well, more millennia than I know the words for. Even if we're talking about a cluster of GPU machines, it's effectively forever. Unless you had some infinite improbability drive (like a quantum computer?) and you guess correctly on the first try.So what did you use to generate the random password? Did you use your favorite programming language's pseudo-random number generator? Remember, 'anyone who attempts to generate random numbers by deterministic means is, of course, living in a state of sin' (John von Neumann). A bad random number generator might only have 2^32 possibilities.Let's put that aside.

It's unlikely that the hacker knows which random number generator you used. It's much more likely that the company storing your passwords is not storing them securely. Passwords should not be stored, ever. Instead, the company should store a hashcode.

The hashing algorithm should be like the butterfly effect - a tiny change in the password produces an unpredictable difference in the hashcode. Unfortunately, many older hashing algorithms, like MD5, are predictable. A hacker can find an MD5 collision - not your password, but one that hashes to the same hashcode - within minutes.There's more to it, but my advice is NEVER rely on password security by itself.

If you care about your security, then use 2-factor authentication or physical security in combination with password protection.Edit: Am I incorrect? I see there was a downvote. Please educate me.

More importantly, that's over the network so you have to trust the site to not log what it gives back, every CA to not have issued a false cert for them (allowing them to be trivially MITMd), and all software that runs on your computer to boot.The 'PRNG' vs 'Real RNG' boogeyman scare is such a load of horseshit.The whole point of modern PRNGs is that they're good enough computers can't detect patterns. I assure you that you're gaining zero security by using random.org vs openssl rand.

And in fact, you're losing massive amounts of security because it's going over the network. I know you covered yourself with the tinfoil disclaimer, but Ima take you seriously here for a thought experiment.I wonder if that's actually a risk?

At least for people not being individually targeted?A random Elbonian hacker who gets a dump of 117 million password hashes has (at least) three approaches she can take to make use of it - she can run oclHashcat or JtR using a good wordlist (say, Hashkiller or phpbb) and a reasonable ruleset to tweak them, which'll fairly quickly reveal common, reused, or guessable passwords in hours/days/weeks - or she can set it to enumerate through an entire $howeverymany bit password space, which is guaranteed to find all the passwords but not before the heat death of the universe. Or she could try only the selections out of that random keyspace that a flawed version of FooPasswordSafe is capable of generating. I'm not sure how long the last approach would take, but it'd have to be both a pretty flawed PRNG and a very widely used password safe for it to come anywhere near as useful as approach 1.(If she's only cracking the hash for the sbeirwagen@gmail.com record, things are somewhat different to if she's just trying to find any 'useable' passwords out of 117 million.

And if she knows sbeirwagen uses DudPasswordSafe.exe, it's likely she knows better ways of attempting to acquire your password than hoping to crack it from publicly released credential dumps.). The best security that an individual can get from passwords is clearly achieved by using a password manager and generating a unique random password for each site, and changing high-value passwords periodically. (It's arguably already impossible for a human to generate or remember enough good passwords, and either way it gets harder as computers get better at guessing human-generated passwords.)However, from the point of view of someone implementing an authentication system, passwords on their own are broken. There will be a significant fraction of users who re-use their password at a site with minimal-effort security. If you subscribe to the idea that computer professionals have a moral duty to safeguard people's private information entrusted to them, then password-only authentication is just broken.The solution is to either: spend the money to implement a multiple factor authentication system (with a secure password database and fraud detection) or use a federated identity service. (Even just sending a one-time login code via email is fine). The latter is simple and takes even less effort than implementing a password system from scratch.There should be fines (at the very least) for having an unsalted password database with more than X number of users.

A one-time password system should also have a second token that was sent to the browser as a cookie over SSL. When the link is clicked the browser sends both tokens (the cookie and the OTP) together. The password is only valid for one browser. Also the OTP should expire after a short time. 1 It has the same security properties as a federated identity service like OpenID (except that it is less vulnerable to phishing.)Of course if you're talking about just a normal plain text static password, then it's obviously wrong to see it in an email.1 'Simple Authentication for the Web' (2007). Aaaand that's why I use 'pwgen -s 22' to generate a unique password for every single site I use. I don't care if a salted password database is stolen; heck, as soon as I change my password I don't even care if a plaintext database is stolen.Why -s?

Because it means each password is a complete word, and may easily be double-clicked in a password list (which is nice, because selection is copy in X).Why 22 characters? Because 22 mixed-case letters and digits are just over 128 bits of entropy.Say it with me:pwgen -s 22. I use 'apg'.apg -a 0 -n 1 -m 14 -x 14 -M NCL-a lgorithm 0 is 'pronounceable'.

1 is 'random chars'.-n umber of passwords to generate-m inimum and ma -x imum length-M specifies what types of characters to use. N = Numbers C = Capital letters L = Lowercase letters. You can also add S for punctuation.14 chars with numbers letters and caps gets you 80 bits of entropy, which is the NIST recommended value for passwords.I store them in 1Password. (Whose password generator I don't like, but is still infinitely better than picking your own passwords in your head.).

I think that's cool from a UI perspective, having that control, because for some services you still want typing to be doable.I mean, try typing this on your PC or mobile phone: &n9$r@pe^q;j2U33Aq8.kTaZ2^ykQAnd compare it with this one:dn#Ze39h644s9DdTpaxRaWW&m33Vy98bAnd yes, their client saves you somewhat, except that there are plenty of instances in which you resort to copy/pasting passwords. Like on Android where the integration is poor.

And on the desktop as well. And guess what, copy/paste is really, really insecure, because apps can be made to listen to clipboard events, so you can have apps that are logging whatever you copy/paste. Oh, and Linux doesn't have 1Password, their old Windows client is getting replaced with a 'modern Windows' app, so tough luck.

Linkedins support site URLs (hosted by custhelp.com) used to look something like thisI know custhelp used to be particularly insecure right around when this hack happened, as I myself discovered several vulnerabilities back then.Also, when you say 'confusion', do you mean it was feigned?Partly. From what I recall it took them quite a while to own up to this very easily verifiable hack, which could very well have been because they couldn't figure out why it happened because it didn't actually happen on their systems. I'm not a security expert either, but I doubt most companies have anything like that running. Many leaks happened through the site itself, which is expected to be able to access and present that data, and even if the attacker transfers an actual file, it's fairly easy to encrypt it beforehand.There is some software that can detect an anomaly in the regular pattern of network usage, and possibly even cut the connection, but again, I'm not sure how effective they would be here.In any case, considering they were using unsalted SHA-1 hashes of the passwords, which was well known to be a poor practice, you should probably assume they had very little protections.

A) Basically the cracker acquires access to parts of LinkedIn's database that store user login details, including scrambled versions of passwords. Unfortunately, the algorithm used to do the scrambling is easy to undo. Since the dump is/was being circulated in the underground, anyone with a copy of it and a little bit of time can presumably unscramble the whole list, revealing all passwords stored at the time the dump was generated. Given that so many use the same login/password for multiple sites.b) There is software (intrusion detection systems/software, or IDS) that does that, but it is rarely present by default. The hows and whys of IDS can be difficult for non-security types to grok, and it can be costly in terms of time, equipment, and money, so it often not encountered. This is misunderstanding the threat model. While obviously fairly painful, am assuming that came from the Stratfor list?

While I concede a piece of paper is far from secure, I'm human and what I do others do too, I would have faired better had I followed my own advice. Conveniently your point does re-inforce they key aspect of my comment, that if Stratfor, a global intelligence company, can fall foul of security then there really are very few safe ports to rely on harbouring your secrets;) Btw, thanks for not locking me out, gentlemanly of you.

'In the meantime, we are using automated tools to attempt to identify and block any suspicious activity that might occur on affected accounts,' the social network said in a statement on 18 May.An update from the last night added that the customers at risk are those that hadn't reset their passwords since 2012. It also says it will provide more information to all of its users in due course.It's not known why the data from the breach has suddenly started circulating four years after the initial breach. Hunt speculates: 'It could be many different things; the attacker finally deciding to monetise it, they themselves being targeted and losing the data or ultimately trading it for something else of value.' What is almost certain, however, is that the compromised password data being traded can lead to greater risks.

Many users will have used the same password across multiple websites.Hunt, in an upcoming interview to be published in a future issue of WIRED, says for people to stay secure online the answer is a complicated one.